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RECENT LEGISLATION
FUTURE INTERESTS-RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES-RECENT KENTUCKY LEGISLATION PERTAINING To ADMINISTRATIVE CONTINGENCIBS-A recent Kentucky amendment to its perpetuities statute follows the lead of Illinois1
in seeking a legislative solution to the problems inherent in applying
the rule against perpetuities to administrative contingencies.2 The amendment provides, inter alia, that the· vesting of any limitation of property
"shall not be regarded as deferred for purposes of the rule against perpetuities or regarded as a suspension of the power of alienation of title to
property3 merely because the limitation is made to the estate of a person,

u.s.c.

12 28
13 The

(1952) §2680. .
interpretation of the "discretionary functions" exception as set down in Dalehite v. United States, note 7 supra, immunizes the government for negligence at a high
"planning or cabinet" level, where policy decisions are made. If governmental activity
at the operational level, where policy decisions are carried out, was also immunized by
application of the "governmental-proprietary" distinction, there would be a very narrow
spectrum of liability, e.g., "proprietary-operational" functions, and "non-discretionary"
acts at the planning level.
14 While this conclusion greatly extends the scope of recovery under the act, it cannot be doubted that Congress intended such broad liability. The Court in the principal
case, at 320, said: "Congress was aware that when losses caused by such negligence are
charged against the public treasury they ·are in effect spread among all those who contribute financially to the support of the Government and the resulting burden is relatively slight. But when the entire burden falls on the injured party it may leave him
destitute or grievously harmed. Congress could, and apparently did, decide that this
would be unfair when the public as a whole benefits from the services performed by
Goverpment employees." See generally H. Hearings Before Committee on the Judiciary
on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d sess., p. 11 (1942).
l Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 30, §153 (a). The provisions of the Illinois statute are the same
as the Kentucky amendment with the exception of the reference to "suspension of alienation." See Yager, "Legislative Modification in Illinois of the Rule Against Perpetuities,"
CURRENT 'TRENDS IN STATE LEGISLATION, 1953-1954, P· 197 (1954), for a discussion of the
Illinois statute.
2 This terminology was used by Professor Leach in describing some of the problems
under the rule. See Leach, "Perpetuities in a Nutshell," 51 HAR.v. L. REv. 638 at 644
(1938).
3 The Kentucky perpetuities statute refers to a suspension of the absolute power of
alienation for a period longer than "lives in being at the creation of the estate, and
twenty-one years and ten months thereafter." Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §381.220. The Kentucky courts, however, have indicated that this statute is declaratory of the common law,
and the common law rule against perpetuities is in effect. See 3 SIMES &: SMITII, FUTURE
INTERF.STS, 2d ed., §1414 (1956).
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or to a personal representative, or to a trustee under a will, or to take
effect on the probate of a will." Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §381.220.
Authorities have frequently recommended remedial legislation designed to overcome specific problems and pitfalls with respect to the rule
against perpetuities.4 The case of the "administrative contingency" is
one such trap which harasses the unwary draftsman. This term refers
to a gift contingent upon "probate of a will," "payment of a debt," "distribution of an estate," or a similar event occurring in the administration
of an estate.I• The validity of an interest under the rule against perpetuities requires absolute certainty of vesting within lives in being and 21
years, and this determination is made as of the creation of the interest.
Thus, a devise conditioned upon the probate of an estate or similar contingency may be held invalid because of the mathematical possibility that
this administrative event will not occur within the period required by
the rule. 6 At times the courts avoid this seemingly harsh result by construction,7 or even by a presumption that the estate will be settled within
a reasonable period.8 When the condition precedent construction cannot
be avoided, however, the weight of authority holds that the administrative
contingency renders the gift invalid under the rule.9 It has been pointed
out that a provision for an administrative contingency does not contravene the purposes of the rule, for such a condition causes no additional
tying up of property.1 For this reason legislative reform has been considered necessary.
The necessity for some type of reform became apparent when changes
in the federal tax laws brought about the increased use of provisions involving administrative contingencies. For example, in connection with
the marital deduction in tax planning for estates, numerous writers have
suggested the creation of an estate in trust with a life estate in the testator's
widow and the remainder to be distributed to the widow's executor or
administrator.11 A question may thereby arise as to whether a bequest
to the administrator or executor, who conceivably may not be appointed

°

4 See e.g. Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror,"
65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 721 at 747 (1952); Simes, "The Policy Against Perpetuities," 103 UNIV.
PA. L. R.Ev. 707 at 731 (1955).
5 See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §24.23 (1952).
6 Johnson v. Preston, 226 Ill. 447, 80 N.E. 1001 (1907); Miller v. Weston, 67 Col. 534,
189 P. 610 (1920).
7 Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580, 46 S.W. (2d) 135 (1932); McQueen v. Branch Banking
&: Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E. (2d) 831 (1952).
s Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 A. 585 (1893). See 4 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT
§374, comment f (1944).
9 3 SIMES &: SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §1228 (1956).
10 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §24.23 (1952).
11 See Casner, "Estate Planning-Marital Deduction Provisions of Trusts," 64 HARv.
L. R.Ev. 582 at 605 (1951); Mannheimer &: Wheeler, "Relative Merits of Two Kinds of
Trusts that Qualify for the Marital Deduction," N.Y. UNIV. ELEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE
ON FEDERAL TAXATION 673 (1953); Neuhoff, "Standard Clauses for Wills," 96 TRUSTS &:
EsrATES 166 at 168 (1957).
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within the required period, would be 'invalidated by the rule.12 In seeking the maximum marital deduction, the testator may leave a trust to his
wife consisting of property to be selected by his executor after payment
of debts and expenses. If the payment of the debts is interpreted as a
condition precedent to the vesting of the bequest, the rule may be violated.ls
Several approaches have been suggested for corrective legislation. One
method is the application of a "wait and see" doctrine to all types of contingencies.14 Under this doctrine we wait and see whether the contingent
interest does in fact vest with the period of the rule.1 5 This doctrine has
. been adopted in Pennsylvania,16 and in a modified version in Massachusetts,
Maine, and Connecticut, where the validity of an interest is determined
as of the termination of certain life estates or lives in being.17 The second
approach requires the framing of legislation designed to correct specific
problems arising under the rule without interpreting the contingency
on the basis of actual events.1s
In response to estate tax drafting problems mentioned above, the Committee on Probate Courts of the Section of Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law of the American Bar Association recommended the statutory
provision enacted in this Kentucky amendment.19 It should be noted that
the committee did not suggest modification in the form of the "wait
and see" doctrine. The committee's approach appears to be more desirable than that of the Massachusetts version of the "wait and see"
doctrine, for that statute would not prevent the possible invalidity of
a bequest to a widow for life with remainder to her executor or administrator, since the determination of the validity of the remainder would
only be deferred until the widow's death. Hence, in this respect the
Kentucky statute is considerably more useful to the estate planner.
An analysis of the language of the amendment does indicate certain
12 See Casner, "Estate Planning-Marital Deductive Provisions of Trusts," 64 HARV. L.
R.Ev. 582 at 606 (1951).
13 See DeFosset, "Marital Deduction v. Rule Against Perpetuities," 29 TAXES 486
(1951). In Braun v. Central Trust Co., 92 Ohio App. 110, 109 N.E. (2d) 476 (1952), the
court held that a provision for the executor to select property to obtain the maximum
marital deduction was not a condition precedent to the vesting of the interest.
14 See generally Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of
Terror," 65 HARv. L. R.Ev. 721 (1952). This doctrine is criticized in Simes, "Is the Rule
Against Perpetuities Doomed? The 'Wait and See' Doctrine," 52 MICH. L. R.Ev. 179 (1953).
15 3 SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §1230 (1956).
16 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §301.4.
17 Mass. Laws Ann. (1955) c. 184A, §1; Me. Rev. Stat. (1954; Supp. 1955) c. 160, §27;
Conn. Gen: Stat. (1949; Supp. 1955) §2912d. See generally Leach, "Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 67 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1349 (1954). A judicial version of the "wait
and see" doctrine appears to have been adopted in Merchants National Bank v. Curtis.
98 N.H. 225, 97 A. (2d) 207 (1953).
18 Simes, "The Policy Against Perpetuities," 103 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 707 at 735 (1955).
19 The committee report is published in Edmonds, "Hints on Marital Deduction Problems," 89 TRUSTS & ESTATES 669 at 672 (1950). The committee pointed out that this
statutory provision was recommended without "attempting to make a formal draft of the
law on the subject."
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shortcomings as an overall solution to the administrative contingency
pitfall. The statute neglects to provide for the condition of "payment
of debts." Further, its thrust is to assist the court in construing an interest as vested rather than contingent when the limitation is to an estate,
trustee, personal representative, or upon probate of a wm.2 0 It does not
appear to deal with an administrative contingency expressly made a condition precedent to the vesting of the interest. In such a case, the court
could still hold the interest invalid because of the possible delay in vesting.
A preferable provision should state that where conditions exist involving
probate of wills, settlement of estates, or payment of debts, completion
of such administration within a twenty-one year period will be presumed.2 1
In these respects the Kentucky amendment appears to fall short as a
remedy to the administrative contingency problem. Perhaps this shortcoming may be attributed to the framing of legislation primarily in response to specific tax planning difficulties. Nevertheless, this statute is
noteworthy for its objective of correcting specific problems under the rule
against perpetuities without introducing the "wait and see" doctrine.

Jules M. Perlberg, S.Ed.
20 The word "merely" in the statute seems to require this construction.
21 Cf. Simes, "The Policy Against Perpetuities," 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 707 at 735 (1955).
See generally, SIMES, PUBUC PoUCY AND nm DEAD HAND (1956).

